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ANTITRUST IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
EDWARD

I.

D. CAVANAGH*

INTRODUCTION

The Second Circuit has played a significant role in the development of the substantive law of antitrust. To be sure, most of the
important antitrust precedents have emanated from the United
States Supreme Court. This is precisely what Congress intended
when it enacted the Expediting Act,1 which permitted direct appeals from district courts to the Supreme Court in governmentinitiated actions. 2 However, the repeal of the Expediting Act,3 coupled with the Supreme Court's arcane case selection process and
the practical limitations on the Court's ability to hear cases, has
shifted much of the burden of hearing and deciding antitrust matters to the circuit courts, particularly the Second Circuit.
This Article will survey antitrust case law in the Second Circuit as it developed over the last century. It is not intended to be a
case-by-case discussion of all antitrust decisions within the Second
Circuit, but rather it seeks to highlight and analyze only the most
important developments.
II.

MONOPOLIZATION

The Second Circuit has played a prominent role in developing
the law relating to monopolization. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 4
makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize" trade or commerce. 5 By its terms, the Sherman Act does not prohibit the status of monopoly but rather only
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. A.B. summa cum laude 1971,
University of Notre Dame; J.D. with Distinction 1974, Cornell Law School; L.L.M. 1986,

J.S.D. 1988, Columbia Law School.
I Ch. 544, §§ 1, 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (§ 1 repealed 1984; § 2 codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1988)).
Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1988)).
Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 402(11), 98 Stat. 3335, 3358.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
6Id. § 2.
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the act of monopolization or attempted monopolization, and the
'
interpretative cases have made clear that "monopoly simpliciter"
'
7
or "monopoly in the concrete" is not prohibited. Herein exists the
fundamental tension that lies at the heart of section 2. The courts,
while repeatedly proclaiming that monopoly power is the evil at
which section 2 is directed," have not taken what would appear to
be the next logical step of declaring monopolies unlawful per se.9
If, indeed, monopoly power is the evil that the statute seeks to address, it arguably makes no difference how that power is acquired,
whether lawfully or unlawfully. On the other hand, if competition
is truly the virtue that the statute seeks to reinforce,1 0 it would be
inherently unfair to condemn those who have achieved monopoly
power by out-competing all rivals and driving them from the
field.1 1 The resolution of these conflicting currents in section 2 law
is very much a tale of two cases 12 -both of them from the Second
Circuit-UnitedStates v. Aluminum Company of America ("Al14
coa") 13 and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
A.

Alcoa

All modern analyses of section 2 issues begin with Judge
Learned Hand's eloquent, though perhaps flawed, opinion in Alcoa. In that case, the government sought dissolution of Alcoa,
claiming that the company had monopolized the market in virgin
aluminum ingot from 1909 to 1938. The trial court held that Alcoa
had not monopolized, and the case was appealed directly to the
I See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) ("§ 2 does not prohibit monopoly simpliciter").
' See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) ("omission of any
direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete").
' See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (citing United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)) ("commodities reasonably interchangeable make up that 'part' of trade or commerce which § 2 protects against
monopoly power").
' Berkey, 603 F.2d at 273; Malina, The Antitrust Jurisprudenceof the Second Circuit,
37 REc. B.A. Crry N.Y. 436, 464-66 (1982).
10 See Blecher, Antitrust Law: Commentary, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 609, 609 (1980)
(noting current "trend among federal courts ... of interpreting antitrust laws to encourage
competition").
" United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter
Alcoa].
' Malina, supra note 9, at 465 ("[fin a sense, then, the Section 2 jurisprudence may be
denoted as a tale of two monopolists: Alcoa and Eastman Kodak").
13 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
14 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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United States Supreme Court under the Expediting Act.1 5 However, the Supreme Court was unable to muster a quorum, and the
matter was remanded to the Second Circuit for final review. 6 The
Second Circuit reversed and held that Alcoa had monopolized the
virgin aluminum ingot market in violation of section 2 of the Sher17
man Act.
Alcoa was a far cry from the monopolists previously pursued
by the federal government, notably Standard Oil Company" and
American Tobacco Company. 9 The company had achieved dominance in the virgin aluminum ingot market through lawful acquisition of patents between 1899 and 1909.20 Unlike Standard Oil Co.
22
v. United States21 and United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
two earlier United States Supreme Court cases, there were no allegations of widespread predatory practices, nor was Alcoa a party to
a series of interconnected secret agreements in restraint of trade.2 3
This is not to say that the company was entirely without "skeletons in its closet." On the contrary, Alcoa was admittedly a party
to a series of agreements during the period 1909-1912 designed to
keep foreign aluminum out of the United States, but ceased participation in these exclusionary arrangements following the entry of a
consent decree in 1912.24 Whether Alcoa's cartel participation had
any causal relationship to Alcoa's dominant position at the time of
trial some twenty-eight years later is debatable but not central to
the court's analysis.
Rather, the key to the court's conclusion appears to have been
Alcoa's size. According to Judge Hand, the company controlled
over ninety percent of the virgin aluminum market.2 5 Judge Hand
equated monopoly with market control, which presumably exists
when a monopolist controls prices. Unquestionably, Alcoa possessed control over the price of virgin aluminum and hence was a
monopolist. But was it a monopolizer?
15 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 432.
18 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
" See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
20 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422-23.
21 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
22 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422-23.
24

Id.

21 Id. at 423, 425.
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In answering that question, Judge Hand accepted as given the
proposition in Standard Oil that the section 2 prohibition of unilateral monopolization complements the section I prohibition of
conspiracies. 28 Thus, in Judge Hand's view, it made no difference
whether supracompetitive prices arose from unilateral activity of
monopolists or the concerted activity of conspirators: "[I]t would
be absurd to condemn such [price-fixing] contracts unconditionally, and not to extend the condemnation to monopolies; for the
contracts are only steps toward that entire control which monopoly
confers: they are really partial monopolies."2
What mattered to Judge Hand was the effect and not the
cause. He bolstered this view by asserting that "Congress... did
'28
not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbad all."
Nevertheless, even Judge Hand was unwilling to accept blanket
condemnation of an entity based on size alone because this would
effectively eliminate any distinction between a monopolist and a
monopolizer. Without missing a beat, Judge Hand explained:
It does not follow because "Alcoa" had such a monopoly, that
it "monopolized" the ingot market: it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it.... A market
may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible to produce at
all and meet the cost of production except by a plant large
enough to supply the whole demand. Or there may be changes in
taste or in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. A single
producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry.
In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although, [sic]
the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act
does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces
which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
29
turned upon when he wins.
Hence, a monopoly is thrust upon a seller and consequently
lawful when (1) only one seller is economically feasible-the socalled natural monopoly; (2) there are changes in taste so that only
one seller is left in business; or (3) monopoly status is achieved by
superior skill, foresight, and industry. Judge Hand thus recognized
2 Id. at 427-28.
2 Id. at 428.
28 Id. at 427.
29 Id. at 429-30 (emphasis

added).
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the fundamental paradox of section 2: that if free and unfettered
competition is a goal, society must accept the seller who has gained
monopoly status by out-competing its rivals.
The key to reconciling these crosscurrents in section 2 is found
in Judge Hand's "thrust upon" language. Judge Hand's application
of the "thrust upon" language demonstrates that "[a]s an operative rule of law.., the 'thrust upon' phrase does not suffice.

'30

For

Judge Hand, a monopoly was "thrust upon" a seller only when it
was the "passive beneficiary of a monopoly, following upon an involuntary elimination of competitors by automatically operative
economic forces.

'3 1

Applying this standard, the court condemned

Alcoa. It found that Alcoa's "doubling and redoubling" its capacity
32
to anticipate increases in demand was unlawfully exclusionary.
This suggests that whenever a monopolist wins additional sales of
a product at the expense of a rival, it has monopolized. If the court
intended this result-and it appears that it did 3 -then Alcoa proclaims a rule of per se illegality condemning competition by dominant firms. Thus, after Alcoa, the successful competitor may indeed be "turned upon" because he may not compete. 4
The court in Alcoa took a theoretical approach in analyzing
conduct under section 2, rejecting the intuitive, practical analysis
employed by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil35 and American
30 Berkey, 603 F.2d at 274.
31 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
32

Id. at 431.

33See Malina, supra note 9, at 472.
For Judge Hand, the only monopoly Section 2 tolerated was the "thrustupon" variety-one in which the dominant company was the "passive beneficiary
of a monopoly, following upon an involuntary elimination of competitors by automatically operative economic forces"-one which do[es] not seek, but cannot
avoid, the control of a market." And applying this stringent criterion to Alcoa, it
was a short step to hold that Section 2 had been violated when the monopolist
"anticipate[d] increases in the demand for ingot and [was] prepared to supply
them." In a sentence which, if taken seriously, announces a rule of per se illegality
for any monopolist who continues to engage in business, Judge Hand summed up
his holding this way:
[Alcoa] insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of
no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel.
Id. (citations omitted).
U Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281, 286
(1956).
11 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63-70 (enunciating "rule of reason" to determine
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Tobacco." The case is an example of the structural school approach to section 2. Under the structural approach, size alone may
be sufficient to create section 2 liability; simply put, bigness is badness. To the structuralist, mere size creates the evils that section 2
was designed to remedy. 37 It is fair to say, however, that the structural approach is now out of the mainstream. Today the orthodox
approach to section 2 analysis looks for size in combination with
bad acts.38
Alcoa has been brutally and convincingly criticized by scholars3 and the courts.40 Nevertheless, if the case is viewed as a product of its time, instead of from a modern perspective, such criticism would appear to be unduly harsh, and perhaps unfair,
because it overlooks Judge Hand's remarkable accomplishments in
Alcoa.41
First, Judge Hand developed an analytical framework for examining section 2 issues that remains the standard today; incredibly, he did so without the benefit of prior precedent.4 2 In Standard
Oil and American Tobacco, the Supreme Court's conduct-oriented
approach clarified its view that monopolies springing from contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade violate section 2, but the
Court made no effort to erect any jurisprudential matrix under
which to analyze section 2 issues. Judge Hand, presaging later de43
velopments in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
and United States v. Grinnell Corp.4 4 reasoned that in any mowhether direct or indirect effect of contract or combination is restraint of trade).
" See American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 175-82 (expressing and reaffirming "rule of
reason").
11 See generally Director & Levi, supra note 34, at 282-88 (discussing significance of
entity's size in antitrust law).
38 See id. at 289 ("new importance ...
must be attached to the concept of abuses");
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1186
(1981) ("battleground centers on characterization of behavior of a monopoly-sized firm as
abusive or competitive").
" See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 170 (1978). "The Alcoa opinion, therefore, stands revealed as a thoroughly perverse judicial tour de force, contrary to the legislative intent of the Sherman Act, the great 1911 cases that formulated the rule of reason and
the entire spirit of antitrust." Id.
40 See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (Alcoa
"has been questioned by just about everyone who has taken a close look at it").
42 See Malina, supra note 9, at 469-71 (noting Judge Hand's influence on development
of law of monopolization).
" Id. at 466.
43

351 U.S. 377 (1956).

"

384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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nopolization case the court must determine the relevant market4 5
and the alleged monopolist's power in that market. Judge Hand's
opinion was less clear concerning the threshold market share that
is necessary to constitute the offense of monopolization. Although
Judge Hand believed that ninety percent control of a market was
sufficient to constitute monopolization 6 and that thirty-three percent was insufficient,4 7 he was unsure whether sixty-four percent
would meet the test.'8 Unfortunately, he did not expound on the
reasons for these conclusions. Nevertheless, Judge Hand's two step
approach remains the standard starting point for section 2
analysis.
Second, Judge Hand's analysis was developed at a time when
courts' understanding of industrial organization and related economic principles was, to say the least, unsophisticated, if not nonexistent. To criticize Judge Hand for not taking into account factors that only years later were understood to be significant seems
unfair. 49
B. Berkey
Despite its shortcomings, Alcoa remained largely unexamined
and unchallenged until 1979, when the Second Circuit decided
Berkey. Berkey presented a slightly different question from that
raised in Alcoa, because with respect to several claims, Kodak's
monopoly in a number of relevant markets was not contested.5"
The question in Berkey was whether a monopolist could compete
on the merits with rivals or whether section 2 imposed special limitations on dominant firms that limited their ability to compete.
Berkey Photo, Inc. ("Berkey") and Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak") were involved in a complex business relationship. In some
respects, Berkey was Kodak's rival; in other respects, it was Kodak's customer. Berkey sold cameras and offered photo processing
services, and therefore competed with Kodak. 51 On the other hand,
Berkey was a customer of Kodak in that it purchased film and
5 Alcoa,
46

148 F.2d at 424.

Id.

47 Id.
48 Id.

4 See Malina, supra note 9, at 469 (Judge Hand cannot be faulted for not approaching
case as one "schooled in ... modern antitrust jurisprudence").
50 Berkey, 603 F.2d at 269-71.
5: Id.
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color paper from Kodak.2 Unlike the Alcoa case, there was no
question that Kodak exercised a monopoly over cameras, film, and
color paper.53 The question, then, was whether Kodak, the monopolist, had monopolized. More precisely, the issue concerned
whether Kodak was free to compete vigorously or whether the
company owed special duties to refrain from competing with its
smaller rivals because of its dominant position.
In answering that question, the Second Circuit had little postAlcoa authority to draw on. To be sure, basic concepts of relevant
market and monopoly power under section 2 had been fleshed out
in Grinnell"'and duPont55; but no court had addressed the critical
question of when a monopolist becomes a monopolizer in any systematic way prior to Berkey. Describing the Alcoa opinion as a
"litigant's wishing well" whose "thrust upon" language "does not
suffice" as "an operative rule of law,"' 56 the Berkey court undertook

a systematic analysis of the unexplored contours of section 2; it
synthesized the earlier cases and provided a comprehensive formu57
lation of the scope of the section 2 prohibitions.
The Berkey court adopted the rule in duPont that the first
step in analyzing monopolization claims is to define the relevant
market.5 8 The court also adopted the two-part definition of monopoly under Grinnell: (1) the possession of monopoly power, i.e.,
the power to control price or to exclude competition; and (2) "the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 5' The court did not
stop there; it further ruled that even when monopoly power is legitimately acquired, the monopolist violates section 2 if such power
is wielded "to prevent or impede competition." 60 Nor may a monopolist use "its market position as a lever to create-or attempt
52
:3

Id.
Id.

, See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-72 (defining relevant market and monopoly power
under section 2).
55 See duPont, 351 U.S. at 391, 395, 404 (defining relevant market and monopoly
power).
Berkey, 603 F.2d at 274.
Id. at 271-76.
Id. at 268-71.
Id. at 274 (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71).
60 Id.
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to create-a monopoly in. another market."6 1 The court summed
up its holding as follows:
In sum, although the principles announced by the § 2 cases
often appear to conflict, this much is clear. The mere possession
of monopoly power does not ipso facto condemn a market participant. But, to avoid the proscriptions of § 2, the firm must refrain
at all times from conduct directed at smothering competition.
This doctrine has two branches. Unlawfully acquired power remains anathema even when kept dormant. And it is no less true
that a firm with a legitimately achieved monopoly may62 not wield
the resulting power to tighten its hold on the market.
Having established this framework, the court sought to apply
it to the facts. Berkey's claims against Kodak, in substance, were:
(1) that Kodak's violations of section 2 in the film, color print paper, and camera markets caused Berkey to lose camera and
photofinishing sales and to pay higher prices for color print paper
and photofinishing equipment than it would have paid but for the
violation; 3 (2) that Kodak exploited its market power over film to
obstruct rivals in camera sales, specifically by refusing to supply
film usable in cameras designed by competitors; 4 (3) that Kodak
engaged in illegal leveraging by projecting its power over film to
the photofinishing market;6 5 and (4) that Kodak exacted monopolistic overcharges on its sales of film and color paper. 66
1.

Predisclosure

Perhaps the most significant issue related to Berkey's claims
for lost camera sales, for which the trial court sustained a verdict
of $15.3 million prior to trebling.6 7 Berkey claimed that Kodak had
monopolized the camera market by introducing a new camera format ("the 110") and a new film, Kodacolor II. Unquestionably, Kodak was a monopolist in the relevant camera market.68 Berkey
claimed that because of its position as an industry trend-setter,
61 Id. at 275.
62

Id.

63 Id. at 267-68.
6

Id. at 269.

" Id. at 270.

"Id. at 271.
"Id. at 296; Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 1093 (1980).

11 Berkey, 603 F.2d at 279.
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Kodak had an obligation to predisclose its new product developments to rivals.6 9 Kodak had followed a policy of not making film
available in formats other than those for which Kodak made cameras; this effectively prevented other manufacturers from introducing cameras in new formats. Because of Kodak's dominant position
in cameras and film, and the alleged use of its film monopoly to
distort camera sales, Berkey argued that Kodak had forfeited any
rights to profits made from innovations for which it did not provide advance notice. 70 Berkey also urged that simultaneous introduction of the 110 camera and new Kodacolor II film enabled Kodak to sell more cameras than it would have sold had the cameras
been introduced alone. 71 Finally, Berkey claimed that it was injured because for eighteen months following the introduction of
the new film, that film was available only in
a 110 format, thus
72
enabling Kodak to gain enormous lead time.
The Second Circuit flatly rejected Berkey's predisclosure argument. The court noted that the rule of predisclosure adopted by
the trial court was uncertain and hence unfair to Kodak because it
would require the company to have been omniscient: Kodak would
have to have known when it was required to predisclose and when
it was not."3 The court noted that there were no workable guidelines to identify at what point and to what extent disclosures
74
would have to be made.

The Second Circuit further noted that withholding competi-

75
tive information from rivals is generally considered fair conduct.

Indeed, such conduct is the very essence of innovative and successful competition. Mandated predisclosure would have a chilling effect on innovation by denying the innovator the lead time from its
new product. 6 This requirement would thus encourage sluggishness, 7 or worse, perhaps, collusion.

Most importantly, the court held that a monopolist should be
encouraged to compete aggressively on the merits." The monopo6:9Id. at 282.

0 Id. at 279.
71

Id.

72

Id.

73 Id. at 282.
74

Id.

75 Id. at 281.
71 Id. at 283.

7 Id. at 281-82.

78 Id. at 281.
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list has no special duty to its smaller rivals by reason of its size
alone, and is thus entitled to benefit from innovation, new product
developments, and lead time.
Similarly, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that by
introducing the new format Kodak unlawfully enhanced its position in camera sales 9 The court unequivocally ruled that Kodak's
introduction of a new format did not constitute an act of monopolization merely because Kodak manufactured a film to fit its camera."0 Kodak's ability to pioneer film formats did not turn on its
possession of monopoly power in film; rather, it was solely the benefit of integration.8 1 While the court also concluded that Kodak's
refusal to sell new film in bulk may well have constituted an act of
82
monopolization, it noted that Berkey did not sue on that basis.
Berkey contended that Kodak's past practices gave rise to a present duty to predisclose, but this position was summarily rejected
by the Second Circuit. 3
Secondly, the Second Circuit held that Kodak's simultaneous
introduction of a new camera and a new compatible film did not
constitute a violation of section 2.84 The court ruled that even a
monopolist is permitted to advertise its products in the most
favorable light:
A monopolist is not forbidden to publicize its product unless the
extent of this activity is so unwarranted by competitive exigencies
as to constitute an entry barrier. And in its advertising, a producer is ordinarily permitted, much like an advocate at law, to
bathe his cause in the best light possible. Advertising that emphasizes a product's strengths and minimizes its weaknesses does not,
at least unless it amounts to deception, constitute anticompetitive
5
conduct violative of § 2.8
Thirdly, the Second Circuit found that even if Kodak had violated the antitrust laws by confining its new film to the 110 format,
Berkey could not recover because it failed to prove that buyers
were dissuaded from purchasing cameras for this reason.8 6 Nor did
79

Id. at 282.

11 Id. at 283.
81

82

Id.
Id. at 284.

8' Id. at
" Id. at
Id. at
88 Id. at

284-85.
285.
287-88 (citations and footnotes omitted).
288-89.
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Berkey establish that Kodak or its dealers sought to persuade conbecause it was the only camera that
sumers to buy the 110 camera
87
could use Kodak's new film.
2. Photofinishing and Photofinishing Equipment
Berkey contended that Kodak used its monopoly power over
film to gain a competitive advantage in photofinishing and
photofinishing equipment. 8 The court found that although this
conduct, if proven, would constitute impermissible leveraging, a
showing that Kodak was merely enjoying advantages inuring to its
photofinishing and equipment arms by virtue of its membership in
an integrated firm would not be illegal.89 Thus, for example, a
dominant firm's refusal to supply a rival with goods or services
needed to compete in a separate market would be unlawful.9 0 At
the same time, a firm without market power that attempted such
conduct would not violate section 2 because its customers could
simply go elsewhere for the needed supplies. The Second Circuit
concluded that Kodak's conduct was not unlawful because it acted
no differently than a smaller firm with integrated capabilities, but
without market power, would have acted. 9 1 Kodak's ability to gain
a competitive advantage with its new 110 system may have been
attributable to the innovation of a novel system of photography,
not to monopoly power. 2
Berkey thus makes clear that even a lawfully acquired monopoly position becomes unlawful when wielded to gain a competitive
advantage in another market.93 Although the court provided an illustration of illegal leveraging, it offered little to distinguish between lawful and unlawful practices by dominant firms. Nor has it
done so since Berkey.
Several important general principles regarding the law of monopolization emerge from Berkey. First, a monopolist is free to
compete vigorously on the merits with its smaller rivals and to capitalize on its technological superiority. 94 Second, a monopolist may
Id.
s' Id.
" Id.
go Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

289.
290-91.
291.
284.
291.
292.

"

Id. at 276.

94

Id.
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take advantage of economies of scale that flow from size. Thus, efficiencies generated by membership in an integrated firm may be
exploited. On the other hand, a monopolist may not lawfully use
its monopoly power in one market to gain an advantage in another.
Third, a lawful monopolist may, and typically will, charge a
supracompetitive price for its product.9 5 Contrary to the holding in
Alcoa, the mere charging of a supracompetitive price does not constitute an act of monopolization. High prices themselves do not impair competition because they tend to invite new entry. Fourth, as
a corollary to the foregoing principle, when a monopolist has violated section 2, the "but for" price from which damages are measured is the price that would have prevailed but for the defendant's wrongful conduct, not the price that would have prevailed
had the market been competitive.9 6
While the core holding of Berkey on monopolization issues is
clear, the opinion is fuzzy at the edges. The court, for example,
does not adequately distinguish between illegal leveraging and legal utilization of scale economies that exist as a consequence of
integration. The court's lack of precision in discussing the leveraging concept has led to substantial scholarly criticism and has left
unclear whether leveraging is an independent offense under section
2 or merely an act in furtherance of monopolization. Nor is it
clear from the opinion at which point advertising by a monopolist
becomes a barrier to entry. Nonetheless, these deficiencies pale in
comparison with the considerable virtues of Berkey, which have
made it the leading authority on section 2 issues.
C. PredatoryPricing
Drawing on the theoretical work of Areeda and Turner, the
Second Circuit has adopted cost-based, bright line rules on predatory pricing. 8 In the leading case of Northeastern Telephone Co.
v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,9 9 the court noted that
"in the general case at least, the relationship between a firm's
prices and its . . . costs provides the best single determinant of
Id. at 274-75 n.12.
Id. at 297-98.
97 Malina, supra note 9, at 477.
98See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86-93 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
11 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
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predatory pricing."' 10 0 The court ruled that "prices below reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be presumed predatory, while
prices above reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be presumed
non-predatory." 10 1 In addition, recognizing that marginal cost is
difficult to quantify, the court held that average variable cost can
serve as a surrogate for marginal cost.0 2 After specific consideration, the court rejected other measures of cost as benchmarks of
predation, including average total cost and fully distributed
costs. 03
In addition, the Second Circuit, embracing the new "economic
learning," expressed skepticism about the wisdom and pervasiveness of predatory pricing:
Predatory pricing is difficult to distinguish from vigorous
price competition. Inadvertently condemning such competition as
an instance of predation will undoubtedly chill the very behavior
the antitrust laws seek to promote. Whether this risk is worth
running depends in part of [sic] the prevalence of truly predatory
conduct. There is considerable evidence, derived from historical
sources and from economic teaching, that predation is rare. Indeed, nowhere in the recent outpouring of literature on the subject do commentators suggest that such pricing is either common
or likely to increase. This does not mean, of course, that this behavior should no longer be deemed anticompetitive. But the rarity of the phenomenon informs our decision as to the appropriate
legal definition.""
Nevertheless, allegations by plaintiffs of predatory conduct
persist, and the Second Circuit is likely to be among the leaders in
formulating the law in this complex area.
D.

Refusals to Deal

Under United States v. Colgate & Co., 10 5 a trader, absent a
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, is free to deal or not to
deal with whomever it chooses. Still, the question of the point at
which a monopolist who has refused to deal violates the antitrust
100

Id.

01 Id.

at 88.
(footnote omitted).

102

Id.

103

Id. at 88-90.

104
100

Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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laws remains largely unsettled. 106 The Second Circuit shed some
light on this issue in Official Airlines Guide, Inc. v. FTC, 10 7 concluding that the monopolist does not have an unqualified obligation to deal with all potential customers."0 ' The defendant in this
case published the only available compilation of airline flight
schedules. It declined to publish schedules of connecting flights of
noncertified commuter airlines, a policy that the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") contended put such airlines at an unfair
competitive disadvantage.109 Reversing the FTC finding of unfair
trade practice, the Second Circuit held that a monopolistic refusal
to deal is unlawful only when the monopolist is seeking to enhance
its own competitive position. The court concluded that "even a
monopolist, as long as he has no purpose to restrain competition or
to enhance or expand his monopoly, and does not act coercively,"
may lawfully refuse to deal. 10 In Official Airlines Guide, coercive
action was clearly not present because the defendant was not a rival and could gain no competitive advantage by a refusal to deal.
Moreover, in International Railways of Central America v.
United Brands Co.," the Second Circuit rejected the claim that
the defendant, the sole exporter of bananas from Guatemala, must
continue its unprofitable operation because shutting down might
mean a loss for the plaintiff, a railroad."' Thus, a monopolist is
not required to deal at a loss, even if this refusal causes financial
detriment to others.

100 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-11
(1985) (concluding that evidence in record supported jury's verdict that ski company had
valid reasons for refusing to deal with competitor); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143, 152-55 (1951) (emphasizing that refusal to deal is "qualified" right); see generally
Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 912 F.2d 1262, 1283-1312 (11th Cir. 1990) (Tjoflat,
C.J., dissenting) (categorizing refusal-to-deal cases under section 2), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1300
(1991); Areeda, Monopolization,Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future,75
CALIF. L. REV. 959, 963-65 (1987) (criticizing Supreme Court's "vague and general" instructions that leave policy decisions to jury in refusal-to-deal cases); Note, Duty to Cooperate
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Aspen Skiing's Slippery Slope, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
1047 passim (1987) (discussing uncertainty created by Supreme Court in refusal-to-deal
cases).
107 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
"o' Id. at 927-28.
109 Id. at 924.
110 Id. at 927-28.

532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).

11

Id. at 239-40.
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III.

STANDING

Section 4 of the Clayton Act"3 authorizes an action for damages by any person "injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.

' 114

The lower courts,

under the rubric of "standing," have narrowed the statute's apparently unlimited reach to preclude actions by plaintiffs too remote
from the wrongdoing" 15 or whose injuries are indirect."" In other
words, the standing doctrine seeks to limit antitrust suits to those
who are in the best position to prosecute the claim and bars those
claims arising from a ripple effect. Thus, when a corporation is the
victim of an antitrust violation, its suppliers," 7 stockholders,118
and creditors" 9 have typically been denied recovery. Similarly,
franchisors and licensors may not sue to recover for harm inflicted
upon their franchisees1 20 or licensees.' 2' Nor may the employee of a

company victimized by antitrust violations sue when the alleged
injury of the employee derives from the injury suffered by the
company.

22

The circuit courts have developed a variety of tests for stand113

15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).

114

Id.

"I See, e.g., Calderone Enters. v. United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295
(2d Cir. 1971) (to have standing person must be within target area of alleged antitrust conspiracy), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
116 See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) (antitrust damages "cannot be extended to ...
indirect or remote parties such as supplier"); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709
(3d Cir. 1910) ("plaintiff did not receive any direct injury").
11I See, e.g., Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir.
1980) (denying recovery to supplier), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Volasco Prods., 308
F.2d at 395 (same).
118 See, e.g., Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Goldberg, 717 F.2d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 1983) (denying recovery to stockholders); Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 894-98 (9th Cir.
1982) (same); see also Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("it is by no means clear that [employees] are barred").
19 See, e.g., Associated Radio, 624 F.2d at 1362 (denying recovery to creditor);
Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
120 See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1970)
(franchisor), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 481 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
:21 SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir.) (licensee), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969); InternationalTel. & Tel. Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 403 (same).
122 Solinger v. A&M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 1978) (employee), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979); Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
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ing, including (1) the direct injury test,12 3 (2) the target area
test, 124 (3) the zone of interest test,12 5 and (4) the factual matrix
approach. 126 Under the earliest approach, the direct injury test developed by the Third Circuit, only one directly injured by the alleged antitrust violations can proceed; indirect, consequential, and
remote damages are insufficient to confer standing. 127 The target
area approach, on the other hand, requires the court to examine
the nature of the violation, the area of the economy adversely affected by the alleged wrongdoing and the plaintiff's relationship to
that "targeted" area. 128 Only those plaintiffs who are within the
area of the economy endangered by the breakdown of competitive
conditions caused by the defendant's alleged misconduct and who
are "aimed at" by the defendant have standing to sue. 29 However,
one does not have to be at the bull's eye to be within the target
area.130 At the same time, if the injury suffered was not central, but
merely incidental, to the defendant's unlawful objectives, the
plaintiff is not within the target area. 131 The target area approach
has been perhaps the most widely used test for standing.
A third approach, similar to the target area test, is the "zone
of interest" test adopted by the Sixth Circuit.132 Under this test,
the plaintiff must show that its injury is within the zone of interest
protected by the statute in question. 3 3 Finally, the Third Circuit,
rejecting the direct injury that it initially championed, has adopted
a factual matrix test which determines standing on a case-by-case
123 See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (direct injury

test).

2I See, e.g., Calderone Enters. v. United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295
(2d Cir. 1971) (target area test), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
121 See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1975) (zone

of interest test).
128

See, e.g., Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506-08 (3d

Cir. 1976) (factual matrix approach).
127

Loeb, 183 F. at 709.

123 See Calderone, 454 F.2d at 1295; Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358,

362 (9th Cir. 1955).
12, Calderone Enters. v. United Artist Theatre Cir., Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). Karseal, 221 F.2d at 362, 365.
1I

Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977) ("[o]ne need not be sitting on the bull's-eye in order to be

within the target of an antitrust conspiracy").
131Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971).
"I See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1975).
133

Id.
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basis.1 34 The factors considered under this test include: (1) the
plaintiff's relationship to the alleged violator; (2) the directness of
the injury; and (3) the plaintiff's position in the area of the economy threatened by the alleged anticompetitive acts. 135
Prior to the Supreme Court decisions in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready1 36 and Associated General Contractors v. Cali13 7
fornia State Council of Carpenters,
the Second Circuit was

squarely in the target area camp, following the lead of the Ninth
Circuit. 38 That is not to say that the target area test has been
uniformly applied by those circuits purporting to embrace it. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a plaintiff meets the target area test if his injury could have been reasonably foreseen. 39
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has held that foreseeability
is not the standard under the target area test.140 Nor have the results in applying the target area test been uniform. The Ninth Circuit has held that a licensor claiming lost royalties for illegal block
booking or blanket licensing by its licensee meets the test for
standing. 1 ' At the same time, the Second and Seventh Circuits
have denied standing on similar facts under the target area
criteria.

142

The landscape of the standing doctrine has been drastically
altered and, unfortunately, muddled by the McCready and Associated General Contractors cases. Part of the confusion lies in the
fact that these two decisions, rendered a year apart, point in different directions. McCready emphasizes Congress's broad remedial
purpose in enacting section 4 of the Clayton Act, while Associated
General Contractorsemphasizes its limitations. In McCready, the
Court ruled that the plaintiff, a psychotherapy patient who had
" See Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506-08 (3d Cir.
1976).
'5 Id. at 508.
136 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
1.7 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
'38 See Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
139 See, e.g., Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
140 See Calderone Enters. v. United States Theatre Cir., Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1297 n.2
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). But see Schwimmer v. Sony Corp., 637
F.2d 41, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1980) (suggesting foreseeability is relevant factor).
14 See Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
141 See Repp v. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd., 688 F.2d 441, 444-47 (7th Cir. 1982); Fields
Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd, 432 F.2d 1010
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
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been denied insurance reimbursement because she had been
treated by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist, had standing
to pursue a claim alleging conspiracy between insurance companies
and psychiatrists to exclude psychologists from psychotherapy by
denying their patients reimbursement for treatment comparable to
that provided by psychiatrists. 4 "
Acknowledging the various standing tests developed at the
circuit court level, the McCready Court nevertheless declined to
embrace or disclaim any of these standards.4 The Court also
specifically declined "to engraft artificial limitations on the § 4
'
remedy."14
Instead it analogized the standing issue to the "elusive" concept of proximate cause and articulated a two-step analysis requiring courts to look:
(1) to the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2), more particularly, to
the relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of injury
about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy under § 4.148
The Court analyzed the first requirement in terms of
foreseeability:
The harm to McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged
illegal conspiracy. Where the injury alleged is so integral an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there can be no question but that
the loss was precisely "'the type of loss that the claimed violations ... would be likely to cause.' ,1,17
Using target area language, the Court found that McCready,
as a consumer of psychotherapy services entitled to financial benefits under the Blue Shield plan, "was within that area of the economy... endangered by [that] breakdown of competitive conditions
resulting from Blue Shield's selective refusal to reimburse.

1 48

143 Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 480-81 (1982); see also Crimpers Promotions
Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 293-97 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984) (emphasizing Congress's broad remedial purpose in enacting section 4).
44 McCready, 457 U.S. at 476 n.12, 478 n.14.
115 Id. at 472.

146Id. at 478.

147Id. at 479 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969))).
148 Id. at 480-81 (quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129
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Secondly, the Court concluded that the alleged injury was the
type for which Congress intended to provide a remedy under the
antitrust laws. 149 Noting that McCready had suffered damages in
the form of lost insurance benefits, which she had to make up out
of her own pocket, the Court declined to limit recovery to psychologists, the intended target of the alleged conspiracy.' 50 The Court
held that McCready's injury was "inextricably intertwined with
the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on the psychologists
and psychotherapy market.''

1

Hence, McCready's injury flowed

"'from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful" and was
therefore the type2 of injury that Congress intended the antitrust
5
laws to redress.

The two-step McCready analysis perhaps raises more questions than it answers. Particularly puzzling was the Court's express
refusal to embrace or disavow the various approaches to standing
that had percolated up through the circuits. The picture was further confused by the Court's apparent acceptance of target area
language. Consequently, it is not surprising that the High Court
revisited the antitrust standing question one year later in Associated General Contractors.
In that case, two unions sued a multiemployer association of
construction contractors and its members, alleging that the defendants had coerced members of the association and others to
hire nonunion help in order to injure construction unions and contractors employing union labor. 153 The Court distinguished McCready by pointing out that unlike the plaintiff in that case, who
was a consumer of services in the market affected by the antitrust
violation, the unions in Associated General Contractors were
neither consumers nor rivals of the wrongdoers.5 Although the
Court did not overrule its holding in McCready, it did take a much
more restrictive approach in ruling that the plaintiffs in Associated
General Contractorslacked standing. To support its holding, the
Court emphasized four factors: 55 (1) that the injuries to the unions
were only an indirect result of the effect of the violation on coerced
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973)).
149

Id. at 484.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 521.

154Id. at 538-39.
15

Id. at 539-44.
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contractors; (2) that the direct victims of coercion-construction
firms and union members-could sue, and therefore the existence
of such a class of plaintiffs whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate their rights under the antitrust laws diminished any justification for allowing the more remote union to
sue; (3) that the union's claims were highly speculative; and (4)
that allowing the unions to pursue these claims could lead to duplicative recoveries or to complex apportionment problems, contrary
to the policy expressed in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.15s
As in McCready, the Court acknowledged the various standing
formulae developed at the circuit court level and again declined to
endorse any.157 It went further, however, casting doubt on the legitimacy of any of these standards by stating that "these labels
may lead to contradictory and inconsistent results." 158 The Court
then set forth its own list of factors relevant to the issue of standing: (1) the causal nexus between the violation and the harm to the
plaintiff; (2) the nature of the plaintiff's injury and whether it is
the type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to vindicate; (3) the directness or indirectness of plaintiff's injury; (4) the
existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self interest
would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in
enforcement of the statute and whether plaintiff is within that
class; (5) the speculative nature of the injury; and (6) the likelihood of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of
damages. 15 9
The Court, without explicitly so stating, appears to have developed its own criteria for antitrust standing. The lower courts are
divided as to whether the Associated General Contractors factors
constitute a test that supersedes the standing tests developed at
the circuit court level. The Second Circuit in CrimpersPromotions
Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc.1 60 has taken the position that the
fact-bound tests in McCready and Associated General Contractors
now comprise the governing standard on standing issues, and further that the leading target area cases, such as Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca Cola Co."6 ' and Calderone Enterprises v. United Artists
'e6

431 U.S. 720 (1977).

:57

Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 536 n.33.

'58Id.
:59

Id. at 542, 545.
F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).

160 724
161 431

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:795

Theatre Circuit,Inc.'62 are to be limited to their own facts. 1 63
In Crimpers, a ,company organized to produce, manage and
operate a cable television trade show to facilitate contacts between
producers of cable television programming and local television
cable stations brought an antitrust action alleging that the two
dominant purchasers and assemblers of cable television shows,
HBO and Showtime, conspired to cause a boycott of the trade
show by threatening to stop purchasing programming from any independent producers in attendance.6 4 Crimpers neither produced
nor purchased cable television shows itself. Therefore, Crimpers
was not a competitor or customer of the defendant, but rather a
customer of a competitor, which is normally denied standing.6 5
The Second Circuit, nevertheless, found that Crimpers was a competitor "in the sense that its trade show would have served to facilitate the direct dealing between producers and television stations
which defendants sought to prevent."' 66
Applying the two-pronged McCready test, the Crimpers court
found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a causal nexus between the violation and the harm suffered, and further that the
plaintiff's injury was of the type that Congress intended to remedy,
since "Crimpers' injury was inextricably intertwined with the injury the defendants sought to inflict on producers and television
stations in the cable television programming market.' 167 In the
Second Circuit's view, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Associated General Contractorshad not so altered the McCready
holding to warrant a different result in Crimpers, and, in fact, it
strengthened the plaintiff's case.16 The court viewed Associated
General Contractorsas a "paradigm of standing":
In sum, despite the able presentation by defendants' counsel,
we are unconvinced that the victim of a successful boycott
designed to support a broad policy of market limitation lacks
standing under § 4 simply because the boycottee was not a buyer
or a seller but was endeavoring to provide a method whereby buyers and sellers could deal effectively with each other without pay.62

454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).

163
16
165
166

Crimpers, 724 F.2d at 293.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 294-95, 296 n.6.

Id. at 294-95.
Id. at 293. The district court decision in Crimpers predated the Supreme Court
holding in Associated General Contractors.Id. at 292-93.
167

166
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ing tribute to the defendants. The contrary view would run
counter not only to the two most recent decisions of the Supreme
Court but to elementary common sense. Indeed, if we should free
ourselves from the miasma of adjectives that has accumulated
around the words of § 4, this case would seem to be a paradigm of
standing. 169
The Second Circuit's expansive approach toward antitrust
standing is further exemplified by its decisions in the merger area.
In R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N. V., 17 0 Bigelow sought to enjoin
a merger of rival herbal tea sellers, Celestial Seasonings, Inc. and
Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., on the grounds that the merged company
would control eighty-four percent of the herbal market and that
therefore the effect of the merger would be to substantially lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.1M Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit ruled that Bigelow, as a competitor
17 2
of the merging parties, had standing to challenge the merger.
Citing United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,'7 3 the court
concluded that a post-acquisition market share of eighty-four percent constitutes an "'undue percentage share of the relevant market'" and "'is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.' ,,174 Nor did the court find relevant the fact that the plaintiff was a rival of the merging parties.
The fact that a competitor of parties to a proposed merger is
seeking to remedy the alleged anticompetitive conduct does not
significantly alter the analysis. Although we must be wary of competitors attempting to obtain antitrust standing based upon prospective loss or damage due to competition for increased market
share, we have little doubt that antitrust injury to a competitor
can be found when the market share of the merging firms threatens to be decisive. Consequently, not only is the post-acquisition
market share of 84% in this case prima facie evidence of monopoly power as the district court found, it also raises a presumption
of illegality and of antitrust injury to competitors of the alleged
"I Id. at 297.
170 867 F.2d 102

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989).
Id. at 104.
172 Id. at 107-11.
173 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"' R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108 (quoting PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363)
(emphasis in original).
171
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monopolist who are damaged by the "'type of loss that the
claimed violations... would be likely to cause.' ,17u
Nevertheless, the court has denied standing in cases in which
the plaintiff failed to show a causal nexus between the harm and
the alleged antitrust violation, 17 6 in which the plaintiff was not prepared to enter the relevant market at the time of the alleged violation, 1 7 and in which the plaintiff whose low bid won the contract
suffered decreased profits as a result of defendants' price fixing.17 8
The district courts in the Second Circuit have tended to follow
the circuit's liberal interpretation of the Supreme Court's antitrust
standing doctrine. For example, in Donahue v. Pendleton Wollen
Mills, Inc., 9 Judge Ward held that a sales representative who alleged that he was terminated by his employer for failure to adhere
to the employer's resale price maintenance program had standing
to proceed under section 4 of the Clayton Act because his employer
used him as "the very means of enforcing the alleged scheme to
1 80
restrain competition."
In Westchester Radiological Associates, P.C. v. Empire Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, Inc.,' the court held that radiologists had
standing to challenge a Blue Cross reimbursement policy that required hospital reimbursement of radiologists in a set amount,
rather than allowing radiologists to bill their patients directly. Despite the fact that they were not consumers or competitors in the
relevant market, the radiologists' injury was deemed "inextricably
intertwined" to the defendant's anticompetitive behavior, which
was specifically directed at the radiologists. 8 2
IV.

ANTITRUST INJURY

Closely related to, but analytically distinct from, the doctrine
15
Id. (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969))) (citations omitted).
178 Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1088 (1987).
17 Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986).
178 Triple M. Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1985).
179 633 F. Supp. 1423 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
180 Id. at 1436.
181 659 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990).
182

Id. at 137.
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of standing is the doctrine of antitrust injury. In Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,18 3 the Supreme Court held that to recover, an antitrust plaintiff must prove more than injury causally
linked to an illegal presence in the marketplace. Rather, the plaintiff must prove antitrust injury, which is defined as
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and
that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It
should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause."184
Brunswick itself involved a merger, but the concept of antitrust
injury has been broadly applied to all types of antitrust
violations.13 5
Unfortunately, the courts have been less than precise in distinguishing antitrust injury from standing, and frequently use the
terms interchangeably. Both concepts do share a common ingredient: "'confin[ing] recovery to those who have been injured by restraint on competitive forces in the economy.' "186 The Second Circuit has tried to harmonize these concepts by adopting the view
that under McCready and Associated General Contractors, antitrust injury is an element of standing. 18" Thus, even after negotiating the antitrust injury hurdle, a plaintiff still must meet the additional criteria set forth by the Supreme Court to establish
standing. Put another way, antitrust injury is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition to prosecute an antitrust suit.
A.

Parties "Injured"

As in the case of standing, the Second Circuit has adopted a
rather expansive view of antitrust injury. Specifically rejecting contrary holdings from other circuits, the court has held that the target of a consolidated hostile takeover may suffer antitrust injury
183429 U.S. 477 (1977).
18 Id. at 489 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125

(1969)).

18 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir.) (claim
under § 1 of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co.,
642 F.2d 845, 856 (5th Cir.) (predatory pricing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981).
188 Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting
GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir. 1972)).
'187See id.
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and therefore may challenge such a takeover on antitrust
grounds."' 8 Similarly, the Second Circuit has maintained that an
alleged cartel participant may suffer antitrust injury by reason of
the cartel's illegal restraints, specifically rejecting arguments that a
particular cartel participant inevitably benefits from cartel
activities.18 9
Yet, the Second Circuit has also noted that the "antitrust laws
were never intended to provide a balm for the hardships occasioned by vigorous competition."1 90 In Triple M Roofing Corp. v.
Tremco, Inc.,1 91 the court held that a roofing contractor that was
the successful bidder on a roofing project had not suffered antitrust injury from an alleged conspiracy between the project owner
and the manufacturer of roof coating.1 92 The plaintiff contended
that the alleged conspiracy inflated the price of roof coating and
that it was therefore injured because its low bid on the roofing project was predicated on the fallacious assumption that the roof coating had been priced competitively.19 3 Had the plaintiff known that
the price of suppliers had been rigged, its bid would have been
higher." The plaintiff contended that damages should be measured by the difference between the actual bid and the bid that
would have been submitted had it known of the price fixing.19 5
Terming this claim "bizarre," the court ruled that the "proscription against price-fixing was not intended to forestall injury of the
type Triple M alleged."'' 9 The lower courts have not hesitated to
1 97
dismiss questionable claims on antitrust injury grounds.
B.

Indirect Purchaser Claims

Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick,
which held that only those who purchase directly from price fixers,

"IConsolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorca, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 259 (2d Cir. 1989).
'89 Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 69 (2d
Cir. 1988).
190 Triple M Roofing, 753 F.2d at 243.
191753 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1985).
19 Id. at 247.
193 Id.
'0' See id.
'15 Id. at 245.
19 Id. at 247.
1
See, e.g., Remington Prods., Inc. v. North Am. Philips, Corp., 763 F. Supp. 683, 688
(D. Conn. 1991) (dismissing claims for lack of antitrust injury); Retail Serv. Assocs. v.
Conagra Pet Prods. Co., 759 F. Supp. 976, 979-81 (D. Conn. 1991) (same); Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 832, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
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and not others in the chain of distribution, are "injured" within
the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act,198 the Second Circuit
was hostile to damage claims by indirect purchasers. Indirect purchasers were found to have been too remote to prosecute private
claims. 9 However, the Second Circuit has not had the opportunity to reexamine the indirect purchaser question in the wake of
the Supreme Court's California v. Arc America Corp.200 decision
upholding indirect purchaser actions under state law. Thus,
whether the Second Circuit would permit indirect purchaser suits
under New York's Donnelly Act remains an open question.
V.

HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS

The courts within the Second Circuit have consistently condemned as per se unlawful, agreements among competitors affecting price. 2 01 At the same time, these courts have eschewed formal-

istic analysis based on labelling, and have evidenced a willingness
to analyze the substance of a transaction before deciding whether
to condemn it summarily merely because literal price-fixing arguably is involved.20 2 The courts ,of the Second Circuit have taken
their cues from the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System ("BM!"),203 a case that
arose in the Southern District of New York and adopted the view
that "easy labels do not always supply ready answers." 0 4 Unquestionably, BMI has profoundly impacted the analysis of alleged
price restraints in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In BMI, the plaintiff, Columbia Broadcasting System
("CBS"), challenged the royalty practices of the defendants,
Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP"), two clearing houses for
, Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729.
See, e.g., FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019, 1028 (2d Cir.
1976) (denying recovery to indirect purchaser of auto parts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097
(1977).
200 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
201 See, e.g., Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d
55, 71 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S.
1, 8 (1979)) (normally, "agreements among competitors to fix prices on their individual
goods or services are among those concerted activities" that are considered per se illegal).
212 See id. at 71-72 (instructing district court on remand to consider substance of tennis
association's practices).
203 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
204 Id. at 8.
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music copyright owners and users.2 0 5 For a specified royalty, the
defendant licensors issued blanket licenses that allowed the licensee access to their entire libraries for a specified period of time. 0 6
Thus, CBS was not free to license individual works through BMI
or ASCAP, but could, if it wished, negotiate directly with copyright holders because BMI and ASCAP were nonexclusive licensors. CBS contended that this conduct constituted price fixing and
20 7
was per se unlawful.
The district court, after an eight-week trial limited to liability
issues, dismissed the complaint, rejecting the claim that the blanket license was price fixing and, a per se violation of section I of the
Sherman Act. The court further held that the blanket license was
not an unreasonable restraint of trade because CBS was free to
negotiate with individual copyright holders. 20 8 The Second Circuit
reversed, concluding that the blanket licensing arrangement constituted unlawful price fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.2 09
Acknowledging the utility of the per se rule, the Supreme
Court nevertheless declined to.apply it to the facts of BM. 2 10 The
Court criticized the Second Circuit for its literal approach to price
fixing, and held that before a practice can be fitted into a per se
2 11
pigeonhole, it must be found to be "plainly anticompetitive.
The Court also noted that the particular restraints, involving the
interface of antitrust and copyright laws, were sui generis, and
therefore must be carefully scrutinized.21 2
The BMI Court found that the restraints were neither plainly
anticompetitive nor without "redeeming virtue. '2 13 The restraint
existed only because of copyright law, and the marketing arrangement was reasonably necessary to effect rights protected by that
law.2" 4 Hence, there was no anticompetitive purpose in the use of
blanket licenses. Rather, the restraints were ancillary to the legitimate objectives of monitoring and enforcing rights under the copy2. Id. at 5.
206 Id.
2 7 Id. at 6.
208

Id.

209 Id.

210 Id. at 8.

211 Id. at 9.
212
213

Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.

214 Id. at 18-19.
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right laws. The blanket licensing system was developed out of the
exigencies of the marketplace, including the user's need for quick
access to copyrighted works, the owner's need for a reliable method
of collection, and the shared need for a low-cost means of transacting business.2 1 5 Thus, blanket licensing provided an efficient, lowcost mechanism for bringing together providers and users, and, in
216
fact, it was the vehicle preferred by most licensees.
Moreover, the Court found that there was little likelihood that
the blanket license could be used to foster an anticompetitive
scheme because BMI and ASCAP were subject to consent decrees
monitored by the Department of Justice.2 7 Among other things,
the consent decrees provided that BMI and ASCAP must share
the right to license with the copyright holder. Finally, the Court
took the unusual step of stating that if a royalty rate could not be
agreed upon, the district court could intervene to establish a reasonable license fee. 21 8
Whether BMI stands as an exception to the general rule of per
se prohibition against horizontal price fixing, or is simply a sui
generis case that does not fit into any previously defined pigeonhole, is a matter that could be debated endlessly and, in the end,
pointlessly. The key teachings of BMI are: (1) the per se label is
reserved only for those activities that are plainly anticompetitive;
(2) courts must avoid the tyranny of labels and analyze the true
nature and effects of competitive restrictions; and (3) the fact that
competitors are parties to a common course of action does not automatically create antitrust liability.
In the sequel to BMI, an action by local affiliates against BMI
and ASCAP raising essentially the same issues, the Second Circuit
applied the Supreme Court's analysis lock, stock, and barrel. Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit ruled that blanket
licensing to affiliate stations did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.21 9 Most recently, in Volvo North America Corp. v.
Men's International Professional Tennis Council,220 the Second
Circuit urged caution in applying the per se analysis to alleged re211 Id.

at 20.

210 Id. at 20-21.
217

Id. at 11.

216 Id. at 11-12.
21 Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
744 F.2d 917, 933 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
220 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
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straints involving horizontal price fixing and horizontal division of
markets in the production of men's professional tennis events, the
tennis playing services of men's professional tennis players, and
the rights to broadcast men's professional tennis events.2 2 1 Without characterizing the alleged misconduct, the court directed that
"on remand, the district court should carefully consider whatever
arguments appellees may offer in support of their practices relating
to player compensation before deciding
whether the per se rule or
'222
1
apply.
should
Reason
of
Rule
the
The Volvo court urged similar caution in evaluating the alleged concerted refusals to deal.223 Indeed, the lower courts have
demonstrated a reluctance summarily to condemn alleged group
boycotts as per se unlawful, and have heeded the admonition of
the Supreme Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers,Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. 224 In Northwest Wholesale, the
Court held that a plaintiff alleging a group boycott "must present a
threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a category
likely to have predominantly anticompetitive effects," and that the
"mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive. '2 25 For example, the district court in Apex Oil Co. v.
DiMauro226 stated:
However, what behavior constitutes a horizontal group boycott
deserving of per se condemnation under the Sherman Act has
been the source of considerable confusion in recent years. The
Supreme Court has warned that courts should not adjudicate allegations of boycotts under section one of the Sherman Act "by
forcing the [defendant's] policy into the 'boycott' pigeonhole,"
particularly where doing so would "extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where
the economic impact... is not immediately obvious." In this context, the Fifth Circuit has noted that "in the course of deciding
whether a business practice challenged under Section 1 fits within
the 'boycott pigeonhole,' many courts find themselves in a detailed inquiry into the economic effects of the practice-precisely
the sort of 'rule of reason' analysis the per se approach is sup221

22
223
224

225

Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
Id. at 298.

22 713 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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posed to eliminate for 'obviously' anticompetitive reasons." Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held that in alleged cases
'227
"there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard.
Thus, in boycott cases especially, the courts in the Second Circuit
are moving away from per se analysis.
At the same time, the Second Circuit has resisted expanding
the reach of the per se rule. In FTC v. Ethyl Corp.,2 8 the FTC
challenged a series of alleged anticompetitive practices affecting
price under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC
Act"), which the FTC conceded were not the result of any agreement, express or implied. Rather, they arose in an oligopolistic
market characterized by high concentration, small likelihood of
new entrants because of a sharply declining market, inelastic demand, and homogeneity of product. 229 The FTC alleged that the
noncollusive acts of defendants in that market facilitated the
maintenance of uniform price levels and the reduction or elimination of price competition in the lead antiknock gasoline additives
market. 3 0 Put another way, the unilateral activities of one defendant constituted price signalling to other defendants and thereby
perpetuated a supracompetitive price structure.
Finding the FTC's theory vague and uncertain, the Second
Circuit rejected price signalling as a basis of liability under the
FTC Act.2 31 The court observed that the FTC's position could be
read to condemn any price increase by any seller in an oligopolistic
market. 2 The court also found that to establish an unfair trade
practice absent tacit agreement, the FTC must allege, at a minimum, some indicia of oppressiveness, such as the seller's anticompetitive purpose or intent or absence of an independent business
233
reason for its conduct.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has not gone as far as
other courts in eroding traditional section 1 prohibitions against
horizontal restraints.3 4 Taking a Chicago School approach, those
227 Id. at 598 (citations omitted).

228729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
229 Id. at 132.
220 Id. at 133.
231

232

Id. at 137.
Id. at 138-39.

233Id. at 139-40.
214See, e.g., Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (hy-

brid horizontal/vertical relationship due to dual distributorships warranted analysis under
rule of reason approach), modified, 810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
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courts have evidenced a willingness to uphold horizontal restraints,
once summarily condemned as per se unlawful, by analogizing
them to joint ventures or, at least when market power is not
shown, to ancillary restraints. 35
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit has been at the forefront in shaping antitrust doctrine and will continue to exercise a leadership role in the
future. Less clear is the significance of antitrust in the overall mix
of cases that come before the court. Given the downturn in antitrust activity at the federal level that began a decade ago, the Second Circuit has had fewer opportunities to confront antitrust issues. Whether this trend will continue remains to be seen.
However, those who have declared that the antitrust laws have
outlived their usefulness would be premature in proclaiming their
demise.

See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 223-30 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (horizontal restraints were ancillary and clearly incapable of suppressing market
competition), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601-02 (11th Cir.) (complex market relationship suggestive of joint venture not subject to per se scrutiny because of its necessity to functioning of system), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir.
1985) (because ancillary restraint made cooperation and increased production possible, rule
of reason applies); Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir.
1984) (lack of market power makes horizontal restraints not subject to per se classification).
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